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Abstract
Individuals respond to the risk of contagious infections by restricting interaction and
by investing in protection. We develop a model that examines the trade-off between
these two actions and the consequences for infection rates.
There exists a unique equilibrium: individuals who invest in protection choose to
interact more relative to those who do not invest in protection. Changes in the conta-
giousness of the disease have non-monotonic effects: as a result interaction initially falls
and then rises, while infection rates too may initial increase and then decline.
We then consider a society with two communities that differ in their returns from
interaction – High and Low. Individuals in isolated communities exhibit different be-
havior: the High community has a higher rate of protection and interaction, and a lower
rate of infection. Integration amplifies these differences.
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1 Introduction
Interactions between individuals generate value, but facilitate the spread of infections. This
tension is salient in diseases such as influenza, HIV and tuberculosis, but also applies to
the Internet and other digital networks.1 In all these examples, infection spreads primarily
through interpersonal contacts: so prevalence can be reduced by restricting interaction and/or
by investing in protection. This paper develops a model that examines the trade-off between
these two courses of action and its consequences for the spread of infections.
In our model, a population faces the risk of becoming infected. Every individual chooses
how much to interact with others in the population, and whether or not to protect himself.
Interactions generate benefits but increase the risk of infection from infected others. Pro-
tection is available, at a fixed cost. The protection rate, the profile of interaction, and the
contagiousness of the infection together determine the extent of the disease in the population.
We first establish that a (Nash) equilibrium exists and is unique. For a broad class of cir-
cumstances, equilibrium protection rates are interior: only a part of the population protects.
Individuals who invest in protection interact more than those who do not. Restricted inter-
action and protection are substitutes. This relation is consistent with empirical observation.
For example, in their well known study on British sexual attitudes and behavior, Wellings et
al. (1994) report a positive correlation between the frequency of new partners and the use of
condoms.
The contagiousness determines the probability of becoming infected from interacting with
1There are 3 to 5 million cases of acute influenza and between 250,000 and 500,000 deaths are attributed to
this infection, annually. In 2012, over 8.5 million people were infected with tuberculosis and 1.3 million deaths
were attributed to it. In the same year, 2.3 million new cases of AIDS were reported and over 1.5 million
people died due to the disease; over 36 million people have died due to HIV/AIDS so far (WHO (2013, 2014a,
2014b)).
The Internet reflects a similar tension: on-line interactions generate rewards but may serve as a conduit for
the spread of viruses and worms which compromise user value. As energy, communication, travel, consumer
interaction increasingly adopt digital networks, cybersecurity has emerged as a major concern. We discuss the
relevance of our analysis for cybersecurity later in the introduction.
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infected individuals, and is a key parameter in the study of epidemics.2 We find that equilib-
rium response to contagiousness is non-monotonic. There exists a threshold level of contagious-
ness: below this value, protection rates are zero, and the response to higher contagiousness
is through reduced interaction only. This threshold reflects the fixed costs associated with
protection: below the threshold incurring the costs is not worthwhile. Above the threshold,
returns from protection outweigh costs. Greater contagiousness now induces greater protec-
tion, and a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the profile of interaction. Infection rates
too may vary non-monotonically – initially increasing and then declining – in contagiousness.
In our basic model individuals are homogenous. We then turn to a society with two com-
munities that differ in their returns from interaction – High and Low. Individuals in isolated
communities exhibit different behavior: the High community has a higher rate of protection
and interaction. As communities integrate, protection and interaction further increase in the
High community while they fall in the Low community. Integration thus leads to falling
(rising) infection in the High (Low) community.
The theoretical prediction on the relation between returns and equilibrium behavior is
broadly consistent with empirical observation. Wellings et al. (1994) report that single people
have more partners and are much more likely to use condoms as compared to cohabiting
couples. Philipson and Posner (1993) report a negative correlation between education/income
and HIV infection: they surmise that higher income raises the returns from the future and
thereby leads to greater investments in protection (the use of condoms). This in turn lowers
the rate of infection.
Our model and its predictions are also related to cybersecurity.3 The equilibrium property
2For a classical exposition of the theory of epidemiology, see Anderson and May (1991). For a recent survey
on epidemics, see Gersovitz (2011).
3Estimates of the costs of cyber crime vary greatly. A recent study estimates the costs to be in the range
of 300 billion USD to 1 trillion USD; this is between 0.4% and 1.4% of global GDP. A recent study for the UK
Cabinet Office reported that the cost to the UK economy is over 27 billion USD per annum (Detica, (2011)).
In 2009, roughly 10 million computers were infected with malware designed to steal online credentials. The
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of positive correlation between protection and interaction is consistent with the findings of
Anderson et al. (2007) and Moore, Clayton and Anderson (2011) on the positive relation be-
tween investments in security and Internet use. The model predicts that the High community
will have higher protection and interaction: this is consistent with the fact that larger firms
are more active in securing themselves as compared to smaller firms (Anderson et al (2007)).
Our paper is a contribution to the economic study of epidemics and cybersecurity. It is
useful to separate the existing research in economic epidemiology into two strands. The first
strand of work takes interaction as given and explores the response in protection rates. This
work includes Brito, Sheshinski and Intriligator (1991), Geoffard and Philipson (1996, 1997),
Francis (1997), Goldman and Lightwood (2002), Gersovitz and Hammer (2004), Galeotti and
Rogers (2013), and Chen and Toxvaerd (2014). A second (and complementary) group of
papers assumes that protection is absent and studies the response in interaction. This work
includes Philipson and Posner (1993) and Kremer (1996). To the best of our knowledge, the
present paper is the first attempt to provide a unified treatment of interaction and protection.
The analysis yields a number of new insights; we highlight two of them via a comparison with
the benchmark models.
Compared to the ‘pure protection’ benchmark, our model yields lower rates of protection.
This is because part of the population foregoes protection and responds instead by adapt-
ing interaction. But compared to that benchmark, infection rates are higher in our model.
This tells us that differences in protection are ‘insufficiently’ compensated for by restricted
interaction.
Consider next the ‘pure interaction’ benchmark, where protection is unavailable. The
more a susceptible interacts, the greater the chances that he becomes infected and, in turn,
transmits the disease to others around him. ‘Pure interaction’ models are thus characterized
annual damages caused by malware is of the order of 9.3 billion Euros in Europe, while in the US the annual
costs of identity theft are estimated at 2.8 billion USD (Moore, Clayton and Anderson (2009)).
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by the property that increasing returns from interaction raises infection (Kremer (1996)). In
our setting, on the other hand, the more individuals value interaction the less inclined they
are to respond to an epidemic by reducing interaction. This implies that higher returns from
interaction lead to higher protection rates and – in sharp contrast to the ‘pure interaction’
benchmark – to lower infection.
Our results have potential policy implications. A first order implication is that demand
for protection will be lower in a model where interaction levels are a choice variable.4 An
important insight from the economic models of epidemiology is the externality in individual
protection. In our model, choosing protection creates an additional externality: protected
individuals interact more and this alters the pool of contacts. We show that this expands the
scope for policy intervention, as compared to the ‘pure protection’ benchmark. Finally, our
work suggests that subsidies on protection should target those valuing social interaction least,
as doing so minimizes crowding-out effects.
The problem of computer network security has been extensively studied in electrical en-
gineering and computer science; for an overview of this work see Alpcan and Basar (2011)
and Anderson (2011). Aspnes, Chang and Yampolskiy (2006) (and the literature that follows
them) study protection choices by nodes faced with a viral infection that spreads through a
given network. Our paper contributes to this literature by proposing a general framework in
which interaction (network) and security investments are both endogenous.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 2,
and analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 studies heterogeneity. Section 5 concludes. All proofs
are presented in the Appendix.
4The experience with swine flu vaccines is worth mentioning in this regard. Most OECD countries have
large stocks of swine flu vaccines; for instance, in England, the NHS stock is estimated to have around 40
million vaccines in stock. This large stock of vaccines has provoked much discussion in recent years, see e.g.,
Times (2010). Our theoretical result points to one relatively unexplored reason for this large stock: lowered
international travel and interaction in response to public measures on quarantine and the fears of epidemic.
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2 Model
The basic model has the following features. A continuum of individuals live for two periods.
Each period, the agents individually decide how much social interaction to have (in a bar say,
or in on-line activity). Social interaction is beneficial, but has drawbacks: interaction in the
first period raises chances of a contagious infection, which reduces payoffs in the second period.
To mitigate the chances of infection, each agent faces two options. He may reduce interaction
in the first period, or invest in protection. The protection rate, the profile of interaction, and
the contagiousness together determine the fraction of the population who become infected.
We next lay out the details and notation of this model.
Social interaction. A typical agent is labeled i. We let kit ≥ 0 denote the socialization
‘effort’ of agent i in period t = 1, 2: each period, i selects kit individuals uniformly at random
from the pool of available contacts.5 We borrow this interpretation from Kremer (1996).6
Given an arbitrary subset A of individuals, the probability that a new contact of i is with an
individual in A is
Pt(select contact in A) =
∫
j∈A kjtdj∫
j∈[0,1] kjtdj
. (1)
Infection. There are two ways to become infected. An individual may become infected
exogenously, with probability  > 0. Or an individual may contract the disease by contagion.
We let α denote the contagiousness of the disease, i.e. the probability of contracting the
disease from interacting with an infected individual.
5The assumption on uniform selection is relaxed in Section 4, when considering heterogenous populations.
There, we allow for ‘search’ to be directed.
6As in Kremer (1996), we abstract from strategic complementarity in social interactions. Making strategic
complementarities more explicit and significant would introduce the possibility of multiple equilibria. While
this would enrich the analysis, our thought is that the key trade-offs we identify would remain important in
this richer framework.
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It is useful to define the incidence qit facing agent i in period t, indicating the probability
that a new meeting of i is with an infected individual. The total probability that (unprotected)
individual i becomes infected during period t is then
pit = + (1− )
(
1− (1− αqit)kit
)
. (2)
Throughout, we assume that α is small so that pit is well approximated by
pit = + (1− )αqitkit. (3)
Protection. Each individual faces the option to invest in protection, for a cost γ > 0.7
The cost may be financial (as in the purchase of a condom, a vaccine or a computer security
software) or reflect direct disutility (as in the case of condoms, or possible side-effects in the
case of a vaccine). The binary variable vit records the protection status of individual i in period
t: vit = 1 if individual i protects, and vit = 0 otherwise. Protection perfectly immunizes an
individual, so pit = 0 if vit = 1.
8 We will say that an individual is unprotected or susceptible if
vit = 0. The protection rate Vt denotes the fraction of the population investing in protection.
We let It denote the infection rate, i.e. the fraction of individuals who become infected during
period t:
It :=
∫
i∈[0,1]
(1− vit)pitdi. (4)
7We have opted for a simple formulation of protection: the costs are invariant with respect to level of inter-
action. This is a good model for a vaccine and for computer security software, but appears to be inappropriate
for condoms where protection costs vary with frequency of interaction. We note that our main results continue
to hold with variable costs of protection so long as the choice for protection is made ex-ante and applies to all
interactions.
8We assume that protection is perfect, i.e. an individual who invests in protection never contracts the
disease. We note that (i) this assumption is justified if the probability of becoming infected is sufficiently
reduced by protection and (ii) our results are unchanged if there is a small probability of getting the disease
from the vaccine itself.
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Returns from interaction. We let ri(kit) ≥ 0 denote the returns from interaction for
individual i interacting according to kit during period t. These are defined by
ri(kit) := θig(kit), (5)
where θi denotes the type of individual i, and g is a twice continuously differentiable strictly
concave function maximized at k > 0. Higher θi may reflect greater returns from interac-
tion due to differences in human, physical or financial capital. A population is (ex ante)
homogenous if all individuals have the same type, i.e. θi = θ for all i, and heterogenous other-
wise. Section 3 studies homogenous populations; Section 4 takes up the case of heterogenous
populations.
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows. Each agent decides, when a period begins,
whether or not to invest in protection and how much to interact during that period. During
period t, unprotected agents become infected according to (3). An agent who becomes infected
during period t ‘dies’ when the period ends. The game ends after period 2, where all agents
die.
Strategies and payoffs. A strategy for individual i determines protection and interaction
in each period before death. We assume that agents maximize expected lifetime returns from
interaction, net of protection costs.9
9A simple way to account for risk aversion would involve subtracting cpi1(1− pi1) to the RHS of equation
(6) giving a susceptible’s expected payoff, c representing the cost of uncertainty for a susceptible. All results
and proofs in this paper apply mutatis mutandis under this alternative specification. We are grateful to a
referee for drawing our attention to this point.
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Equilibrium. The structure of the game as well as the distribution of types in the popu-
lation are common knowledge. The model defines a game of complete information between
individuals. We study the Nash equilibria of this game.
3 Analysis
This section presents our analysis of the choice of adaptive interaction and protection and
its implications for infection in homogenous populations. We establish existence of a unique
equilibrium, and compare its properties with those obtained in ‘pure interaction’ models on
the one hand and ‘pure protection’ models on the other. We explore the effects of varying the
contagiousness of the disease, and the returns from interaction.
We begin with some preliminary observations on the framework defined earlier allowing
us to simplify the formal analysis of our model. Since all agents die when the final period
ends, they need not be concerned about infection during that period. This yields vi2 = 0 and
ki2 = k, for all i, in any equilibrium. An unprotected individual i’s expected payoff may thus
be simplified to
Πi(ki1, vi1 = 0) = ri(ki1) +
(
1− pi1
)
ri(k), (6)
with pi1 given by (3): interacting according to ki1 in period 1 confers returns ri(ki1) during
that period, but also reduces chances of a payoff in the period which follows.
Observe similarly that a protected individual i’s expected payoff must in any equilibrium
be given by
Πi(vi1 = 1) = 2ri(k)− γ. (7)
Equations (6) and (7) allow us to reduce the initial setup to an equivalent but simpler
one-shot game, and to focus exclusively on first-period variables. Henceforth time subscripts
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will be dropped, under the convention that a variable without a time subscript always refers
to the first period. We will say that an equilibrium is interior if the protection rate V lies in
the open interval (0, 1).
Our first result establishes existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium in a homogenous
population.
Proposition 1 Consider a homogenous population. An equilibrium exists and is unique.
We briefly describe the ways in which interaction and protection shape the payoffs of
a susceptible. The negative externality exerted by unprotected individuals is governed by
the incidence of the disease q – the probability that an individual with whom an individual
interacts happens to be infected. The incidence of the disease can be written as the product
of two terms: (i) the probability z of meeting another susceptible, and (ii) the probability p
that a susceptible is in fact infected.
Since in a homogenous population the incidence faced by all individuals is the same, and
payoffs are strictly concave in interaction, then all suscpetibles must in any equilibrium choose
the same interaction. Let here ku denote the interaction of unprotected individuals in a given
equilibrium. Since k maximizes protected individuals’ payoffs then, using (1) where A now
refers to the subset of susceptibles, the probability z of meeting an unprotected individual is
z =
ku(1− V )
ku(1− V ) + kV
. (8)
Substituting q = zp in (3) and solving for p yields
p =

1− (1− )αzku . (9)
A pair (V, ku) constitutes an interior equilibrium if and only if protected and unprotected
9
individuals have equal payoffs, and
ku = arg max
k
[
r(k) + (1− )(1− αzpk)r(k)] (10)
with z and p satisfying, respectively, equations (8) and (9).
The proof of the Proposition has two steps. We first consider the pure interaction game
given a fixed protection rate V – this is a game played among unprotected individuals choosing
how much to interact when the remaining fraction V of the population protects. We show that
this is a game of strategic substitutes, with a unique equilibrium. The ‘equilibrium’ payoffs
attained in the pure interaction game are strictly increasing and continuous in the protection
rate V . As payoffs from protection are fixed, existence and uniqueness of equilibrium in the
overall game of protection and interaction follows.
The dual response to infection (restricted interaction and protection) plays a central role
in our model. To illustrate its role, we now compare our equilibrium (a) with equilibrium in
the ‘pure protection’ model with interaction fixed exogenously at the no-disease optimum k
(benchmark 1) and (b) with equilibrium in the ‘pure interaction’ model with no protection
(benchmark 2). We consider here the contrast between our model and benchmark model 1;
the contrast with benchmark model 2 is developed after the statement of Proposition 3 below.
An important insight from the economic study of epidemiology is that a part of the benefits
from protection comes from the reduced risk of infecting others, which agents fail to internalize.
In our model, choosing protection creates an additional externality compared to the benchmark
model 1: protected individuals interact more and this alters the pool of contacts. This remark
suggests that the scope for policy intervention may be greater when individuals can adapt
social interaction, as compared to the ‘pure protection’ benchmark . Our next result illustrates
this point in two ways. First, we show that public protection programs may prove superfluous
in benchmark 1, and yet be socially desirable in our framework of adaptive interaction. Second,
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we show that adaptive interaction ultimately induces higher rates of infection.
Proposition 2 Consider a homogenous population. Let (V ∗, I∗) and (V 1, I1) denote the equi-
librium protection and infection rates in our model and benchmark model 1, respectively. Then:
1. V ∗ ≤ V 1, with strict inequality if V ∗ and V 1 ∈ (0, 1).
2. V ∗ and V 1 ∈ (0, 1)⇒ I∗ > I1.
The proof of the first part builds on the observation that, for any given rate of protection,
the resulting incidence of the disease is higher with fixed interaction as compared to the case
where unprotected individuals adapt (and hence lower) interaction. This pushes the returns
from protection upwards, inducing higher protection rates. The second part is more delicate:
protection is higher in the benchmark model, but adaptive interaction in our model may
compensate for the difference in protection rates. Our proof shows that while interaction
adapts downward, it does so ‘insufficiently’. As a result, incidence and infection are both
higher in our model, as compared to the benchmark model 1.
Consider next the implications of increasing returns from interaction. In what follows V (θ)
denotes the equilibrium protection rate in a homogeneous population with type θ.
Proposition 3 Suppose V (θ) ∈ (0, 1). An increase in the returns θ induces a first-order
stochastic dominance shift in the equilibrium profile of interaction and raises equilibrium pro-
tection. Moreover, depending on the function g, increasing θ may reduce equilibrium infection
rates.
The intuition behind the first part of Proposition 3 is straightforward. Higher returns from
interaction enhance the appeal of protection relative to the option of reducing interaction. In
equilibrium, more agents protect. This lowers the incidence q of the disease, allowing in turn
susceptibles to interact more.
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The second part of the Proposition is perhaps most interesting. Increased protection tends
to lower infection; yet higher interaction from the susceptible part of the population pushes
infection up. This raises the question: how is infection globally affected by increased returns
from interaction? The key issue is the elasticity of interaction: if this elasticity is not too
high, then the effect of higher protection will prevail. We show in the proof, using an example
with logarithmic returns, that infection rates may fall with a rise in θ.
The latter observations are helpful in bringing out the differences between our model and
the ‘pure interaction’ benchmark model 2. In the absence of protection, the more individuals
value interaction, the greater the negative equilibrium externality each agent imposes on
others. In the ‘pure interaction’ benchmark, therefore, an increase in θ unambiguously raises
the infection rate (Kremer (1996)). As shown in the discussion above, in our model the effects
of increasing returns θ are very different. The more individuals value interaction, the less
inclined they are to respond to an epidemic by reducing interaction: this pushes protection
up and leads to falling infection rates for a broad class of applications.
We turn finally to the effects of contagiousness on behavior and infection rates. Our anal-
ysis establishes that there are two phases in the equilibrium response to contagiousness. In
phase I, at low α, the response to higher contagiousness is entirely through reduced inter-
action. In phase II, at high α, greater contagiousness induces more protection but there is
no reduction of social interaction. Social interaction among the unprotected stays constant,
but because more individuals protect (and protected individuals interact more) the profile of
interaction undergoes a first-order stochastic dominance shift. Hence, somewhat surprisingly,
social interaction is non-monotonic in contagiousness: it first decreases but eventually rises.
Proposition 4 Consider a homogenous population. Equilibrium protection V increases with
contagiousness α. Moreover, there exist α and α, α ≤ α, such that:10
10Lemma 3 in the Appendix shows that both threshold values are decreasing in , the exogenous probability
of infection.
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1. If α ≤ α then a reduction in α induces a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the
equilibrium profile of interaction. Infection rate changes depend on the elasticity of
interaction with respect to α.
2. If α < α < α then an increase in α induces a first-order stochastic dominance shift in
the equilibrium profile of interaction, and a decrease of the infection rate I.
3. If α ≥ α then all agents protect, and I = 0.
We start by observing that if V = 0 then the negative externality exerted by unprotected
individuals is strictly increasing in contagiousness, α. This implies that the equilibrium in-
teraction of unprotected individuals, ku, decreases in α and completes the arguments for part
1.
Consider next an interior equilibrium: an individual must be indifferent between protecting
or not. Since payoffs from protection are unaffected by α, the payoffs earned by susceptibles
must be unchanged as well. This implies that the equilibrium externality αq(α) is constant
in α. As α is rising, the incidence q(.) must be falling. Now consider protection. Suppose
that protection were falling in α. Then the only way to reduce the incidence q(α) would be to
reduce the interaction ku. But we have already proven that the externality αq(α) is constant
in α, and so is ku. This contradiction establishes that protection rates must be increasing
in α. As the equilibrium ku is constant in α, and the fraction of protected individuals rises,
an increase in contagiousness α thus induces a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the
equilibrium profile of interaction. This completes the argument for part 2.
We conclude with a brief discussion on the effect of contagiousness on infection rates.
Kremer (1996) observes that (in the absence of protection) higher contagiousness may lead to
lower infection rates if the elasticity of interaction with respect to contagiousness is greater
than one. The remark on infection rates in the first part of Proposition 4 follows similar logic.
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The contrast is, however, sharp if we look at infection rates in an interior equilibrium (i.e.
α ∈ (α, α)): in this case higher contagiousness always lowers infection rates. The idea is as
follows. The externality αq(α) remains constant over this range. The probability of infection
of an unprotected individual must therefore remain unchanged as well. But I = (1− V )p, so
the infection rate I falls, since equilibrium V is rising in α.
∫
kidik
1
0
ku
V
α α
Figure 1
Contagiousness α is measured on the x-axis. We measure on the y-axis the
equilibrium average interaction in the population, the equilibrium vaccination
rate V , and the equilibrium interaction of unprotected agents ku.
4 Heterogenous populations
This section studies the effect of population heterogeneity on behavior and infection rates.
We model heterogeneity in terms of differences in returns from interaction. Our goal is to
examine the interplay between this heterogeneity and the choice between restricted interaction
and protection. Observe that the case where the different ‘types’ of individuals are completely
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segregated is covered by Proposition 3 above. Our analysis reveals that the integration level
between different types has powerful effects on behavior and infection rates.
We shall suppose that a heterogenous population consists of two equal size communities of
individuals with types θH and θL respectively, θH > θL. A parameter β measures integration
between the two communities. With probability β (resp., 1 − β), social interaction takes
place across communities (resp., within one’s own community). Thus, for β = 0 the two
communities of individuals are completely segregated, while for β = 1 all interaction takes
place across communities.11 The probability that a new meeting of an individual in community
J is with an individual in subset A ⊂ J ′ is thus
P(i ∈ J selects contact in A ⊂ J ′) = ((1− β)I{J=J ′} + βI{J 6=J ′}) ∫i∈A kidi∫
i∈J ′ kidi
,
where as usual I{.} denotes an indicator variable.
We first study the effects from integrating communities moderately. We then explore,
through an example, the multiplicity of equilibria arising when most interaction takes place
across communities. Throughout, we focus the analysis on the more interesting case where
the equilibrium protection rate in a homogenous population with type θJ is interior, i.e.
V (θJ) ∈ (0, 1), J ∈ {H,L}.12
Consider first β = 0. When β = 0, results from Proposition 3, concerning homogenous
populations, apply. Equilibrium is unique and entails strictly higher incidence in community
L than in community H. So consider now a small increase in β. Other things equal, an
11For consistency, and to abstract from issues regarding community size, we assume that if interaction in
community J is greater than it is in community J ′ then only a fraction of individuals in community J interact
across communities. This ensures in a simple way that total interaction from community J to J ′ equals total
interaction from J ′ to J . Formally, if
∫
i∈J kidi >
∫
i∈J′ kidi then partition community J as J1
⋃
J2 such that∫
i∈J1 kidi =
∫
i∈J′ kidi, and individuals in J2 interact within J2 only.
12The analysis of the other cases is similar, but the results are plainer. For instance if V (θH) = V (θL) = 0
then for any β, equilibrium is unique and entails all individuals in both communities remaining unprotected.
Similarly, if V (θH) = V (θL) = 1 then for any β, equilibrium is unique and entails all individuals in both
communities protecting.
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individual in community H faces higher incidence compared to β = 0, since he will interact
with some probability with an individual from community L where the incidence is higher.
This raises incentives to protect in community H. By symmetry, an individual in community
L now faces lower incidence since he will interact, with some probability, with an individual
in community H where the incidence is lower. This lowers incentives to protect in community
L. Integrating communities moderately therefore benefits L types: As integration grows, the
burden of protection tends to fall on H types, while L types free-ride. The next proposition
summarizes these insights, and explores their implications for interaction and infection in the
two communities.
Proposition 5 Consider a heterogenous population such that equilibrium is interior in both
isolated communities, so that V (θJ) ∈ (0, 1), J ∈ {H,L}. Then an equilibrium exists for all
levels of integration β, and is unique over a range [0, β], where β ∈ (0, 1/2). Moreover, over
this range, increasing β induces (i) higher (lower) protection in community H (in community
L), (ii) lower (higher) infection in community H (in community L) and (iii) a (inverse)
first-order stochastic dominance shift in the equilibrium profile of interaction of community H
(community L).
We explained part (i) above. We now develop the intuition underlying parts (ii) and (iii).
By continuity, for low values of β the unique equilibrium is interior in both communities.
So, for small values of β, individuals in each community must remain indifferent between
protection and no protection. Equilibrium payoffs of unprotected individuals therefore remain
unchanged as β varies, given that payoffs of protected individuals are constant. Since payoffs
of unprotected individuals are strictly falling in the incidence of the disease, this implies that
the incidence faced by individuals in both communities must remain unaffected by changes in
β. This in turn implies that, in each community, susceptible interaction must be unchanged,
and so must their probability of infection. However, since the protection rate grows (falls) in
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H (L), the fraction of infected individuals must in fact decrease (increase) in community H
(L). Finally, the arguments above establish that more integration induces higher protection in
community H but no reduction of interaction by unprotected individuals in that community.
Hence, an increase in β induces a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the equilibrium
profile of interaction of community H. Similar reasoning establishes the claim for community
L.
There are interesting implications of Proposition 5. To illustrate, suppose that prior to
the stage at which individuals make a decision a social planner is able to allocate protection
to a small subset of the population. If communities are largely segregated (β small), the
unique equilibrium is interior in both communities. Any allocation of the social planner
therefore induces complete crowding-out of private incentives, leaving the resulting equilibrium
unaffected. Suppose, on the other hand, that communities are sufficiently integrated so that
in the unique equilibrium all individuals in community H protect while all individuals in
community L remain unprotected. In this case, allocating protection to high types once again
crowds-out private incentives, whereas allocating protection to low types strictly improves
welfare in the resulting equilibrium, due to the positive externalities from protection within
community L. More generally, targeting individuals valuing interaction least tends to minimize
crowding-out in our model and as such, somewhat counter-intuitively, makes it attractive for
public policy to protect individuals valuing social interaction least.
We have so far focused on the case of limited integration between communities. Greater
integration typically implies multiple equilibria. To bring out this point in the simplest way,
we next consider an example where β = 1 and focus on a range of parameters where isolated
communities exhibit interior equilibria. The case β = 1 corresponds, e.g., to a situation where
all sex is heterosexual. We show in the example that three equilibria exist. The first equilib-
rium is interior in both communities. The other two equilibria are extremal: all individuals
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protect in one of the two communities, while all individuals remain unprotected in the other.
In these equilibria, a protected individual interacts only with unprotected individuals, and
vice versa. Protection is thus attractive for those who do protect, while remaining unpro-
tected is optimal under the guarantee never to meet an infected individual. In this setting,
it is possible to show that social welfare is highest in the corner equilibrium where H types
protect and L types do not. Extremal equilibria are attractive since they maximize meetings
between protected and unprotected individuals. Of the two extremal equilibria, that in which
high types protect dominates due to the fact that the loss from reduced interaction is worse
for high types than low.
Proposition 6 Consider a heterogenous population, β = 1, and q(θJ) ∈ (0, ), J ∈ {H,L}.
There exist exactly three equilibria. In equilibrium 1 all individuals in groups H protect and all
individuals in group L remain unprotected. In equilibrium 2 all individuals in group L protect
and all individuals in group H remain unprotected. Equilibrium 3 is interior in both groups.
If Wk denotes average social welfare in these equilibria then W1 > W2 > W3.
5 Conclusion
Social and economic interactions generate rewards but also facilitate the spread of infections.
Individuals can respond to this risk by restricting interaction and by investing in protection.
This paper develops a model that examines the trade-off between these two actions and the
implications for the prevalence of infections.
We study a setting in which an infection may be contracted either exogenously or through
contact with an infected individual. Individuals decide on how much to interact with oth-
ers and whether to protect themselves. We study the equilibrium levels of protection and
interaction and the population rate of infection.
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We establish that there exists a unique equilibrium. We then derive a number of interest-
ing implications of the co-determination of interaction and protection. There is a threshold
property with regard to the effects of contagiousness. Below a threshold level, interaction
falls in contagiousness, while it rises above the threshold. Infection rates too may move non-
monotonically: below a threshold level they rise in contagiousness and above the threshold
they fall with contagiousness.
In the basic model, all individuals are homogenous. We extend the model to study a
society composed of two communities that differ in their returns from interaction – High and
Low. Individuals in isolated communities exhibit different behavior: the High community
has a higher rate of protection and interaction. As communities integrate, protection and
interaction further increase in the High community while they fall in the Low community.
Integration thus leads to lower (higher) disease prevalence in the High (Low) community.
6 Appendix
Remark: We focus throughout this Appendix on the ‘reduced’ one-shot game derived in the
beginning of Section 3 with payoffs given by (6) and (7), and thus drop the time subscripts
from all notation.
Consider a homogenous population. Define the pure interaction game given protection
rate V (PIGGV) as the game played among unprotected individuals choosing how much to
interact when the remaining fraction V of the population protects. Let qi(ku;V ) denote the
incidence of the disease facing individual i in the PIGGV, when other unprotected individuals
interact according to ku. Note that qi(ku;V ) = p−i.zi, where zi is the probability that an
arbitrary meeting of i is with an unprotected individual and p−i is the probability that an
unprotected individual other than i is in fact infected. Since the population is composed of a
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continuum of individuals, notice that p−i = p and zi = z, with z given by (8). Moreover, using
(3) yields p = + (1− )αpzku, and then (9) upon rearrangement. This shows, in particular,
that qi(ku;V ) = p.z strictly increases in ku (z increases in ku, while p is increasing in each of
z and ku).
The payoffs of i in the PIGGV as a function of ki as well as other players’ actions k−i can
be written
Πi(ki, k−i) = ri(ki) +
(
1− pi(ki, qi(k−i;V ))
)
ri(k),
where pi(ki, qi(k−i;V )) = + (1− )αq(k−i;V )ki. Taking cross derivatives yields
∂Πi
∂ki∂k−i
= −α(1− ) ∂qi
∂k−i
ri(k) > 0,
where the inequality follows from the arguments above. The PIGGV is thus a game of strategic
substitutes. Standard considerations then establish that an equilibrium of the PIGGV exists,
is unique, and symmetric (uniqueness and symmetry follow the fact that the incidence of
the disease is the same for all individuals, together with the strict concavity of payoffs with
respect to interaction). Let in what follows Π(V ) denote the equilibrium payoff achieved by
unprotected individuals in the PIGGV. The next lemma is useful:
Lemma 1 Π(V ) is continuously differentiable.
Proof: First we show that ku(V ) – the equilibrium interaction of unprotected individuals in
the PIGGV – is continuously differentiable. Using first order conditions yields a continuously
differentiable G(., .) implicitly defining ku(V ) through the equation G(ku(V ), V ) = ku(V ).
Hence, using the Implicit Function Theorem shows that ku(V ) is continuously differentiable.
Next, note that qi(ku;V ) (the incidence of the disease facing individual i in the PIGGV,
when other unprotected individuals interact according to ku) is continuously differentiable.
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The equilibrium value of the incidence of the disease in the PIGGV, q(V ), is thus continuously
differentiable too since q(V ) = qi(ku(V );V ).
The proof is concluded by noting that the probability of infection is continuously differen-
tiable in the incidence q, while the returns from interaction are continuously differentiable in
ku.

Proof of Proposition 1: Our proof uses the analysis of the PIGGV given above. Recall that
Π(V ) denotes the equilibrium payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV. By
investing in protection, an individual achieves payoff 2r(k) − γ. Thus, an equilibrium of the
overall game with protection rate V and in which unprotected individuals interact according
to ku exists if and only if ku is the equilibrium interaction of unprotected individuals in the
PIGGV and:
1. if V = 0 then Π(0) > 2r(k)− γ;
2. if V = 1 then Π(1) < 2r(k)− γ;
3. if V ∈ (0, 1) then Π(V ) = 2r(k)− γ.
Next, we claim that Π(V ) is strictly increasing in V . To establish the claim, we first show
that q(V ) – the equilibrium value of the incidence of the disease in the PIGGV – strictly
decreases in V . Suppose, for a contradiction, that q(V ) increases in V . Each unprotected
individual would then find it in his best interest to interact (weakly) less following a rise in
V , i.e. ku must decrease in V . Since z = ku(1− V )/(ku(1− V ) + kV ), this also implies that
z must strictly decrease in V (more individuals protect, and unprotected individuals interact
less). But then, by (9) (giving p as a function of z and ku), each unprotected individual must
in equilibrium exhibit strictly lower probability of infection following a rise in V . We have
thus established that if q(V ) increases in V , then both z and p must strictly decrease in V .
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But q = zp, so that q(V ) must strictly decrease in V too – an obvious contradiction. Hence,
q(V ) is strictly falling in V . The maximum payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in
the PIGGV thus strictly increases in V . This establishes that Π(V ), the equilibrium payoff
achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV, strictly increases in V .
Combining the first part of the proof with the fact that Π(V ) strictly increases in V
establishes existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium. Specifically:
1. if Π(0) > 2r(k)− γ then V = 0 in the unique equilibrium;
2. if Π(1) < 2r(k)− γ then V = 1 in the unique equilibrium;
3. if Π(0) < 2r(k)− γ < Π(1) then the equilibrium protection rate is uniquely determined
by
Π(V ) = 2r(k)− γ.

Proof of Proposition 2: We begin with part 1. Let Π1(V ) denote the payoffs of unprotected
individuals with fixed interaction k when a fraction V of the population protects. Fixing V ,
note that the probability z of meeting an unprotected individual is strictly greater with fixed
interaction than in the PIGGV. Since, by (9), p is increasing in each of z and ku this also
implies that the probability of infection is strictly greater with fixed interaction than in the
PIGGV, as is ultimately the incidence q = zp. This establishes that Π(V ), the maximum
payoff achieved by unprotected individuals (in equilibrium) in the PIGGV, must be greater
than Π1(V ). That V ∗ ≤ V 1, where V ∗/ V 1 denote the equilibrium protection rate under
adaptive/fixed interaction, now follows immediately (V ∗/ V 1 are uniquely determined by the
intersection of the strictly increasing functions Π(V )/ Π1(V ) with the ‘horizontal’ schedule
equal to 2r(k)− γ).
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We now prove part 2 of the Proposition. V ∗ and V 1 ∈ (0, 1) implies that in both cases
(fixed interaction and adaptive interaction) the equilibrium payoffs achieved by unprotected
individuals equal 2r(k) − γ. Since for any given value of the incidence the option to adapt
interaction raises the maximum payoffs attainable by unprotected individuals, we must have
q∗ > q1. The proof is concluded by noting that
I∗ − I1 = p∗(1− V ∗)− p1(1− V 1)
= p∗[(1− V ∗) + z∗ − z∗]− p1[(1− V 1) + z1 − z1]
= [q∗ − q1] + p∗[(1− V ∗)− z∗]
> 0.
The last equality follows from noting that (1− V 1) = z1. The inequality is due to the remark
above that q∗ > q1, and the observation that (1− V ∗)− z∗ > 0.

Proof of Proposition 3: In this proof ku(θ), q(θ), V (θ), and so on will be used to denote
equilibrium values in a homogenous population of type θ. The proof is in three steps. We
first establish dq(θ)/dθ < 0. We then show that dV (θ)/dθ > 0. Finally, we show that with
logarithmic returns then dI(θ)/dθ < 0.
Step 1: Let p(ki, qi) denote the infection probability of i interacting according to ki and facing
incidence qi (notice that, fixing ki, the probability of infection is independent of θi). Observe
that ∂p/∂qi > 0.
The equilibrium indifference condition between vaccinating or not can be written as
2θg(k)− γ = θg(ku(θ)) +
(
1− p(ku(θ), q(θ))
)
θg(k).
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Differentiating with respect to θ yields
2g(k) = g(ku(θ)) +
(
1− p(ku(θ), q(θ))
)
g(k)− ∂p
∂q
dq
dθ
θg(k),
where we have used the fact that ku(θ) is optimal for unprotected individuals, given q(θ).
Rearranging yields
dq
dθ
= −
2g(k)− g(ku(θ))−
(
1− p(ku(θ), q(θ))
)
g(k)
∂p
∂q
θg(k)
.
Step 1 is concluded by noting that both numerator and denominator in the expression above
are strictly positive.
Step 2: First notice using (10) that the first step of the proof implies dku(θ)/dθ > 0 (lower
incidence reduces the marginal cost of interaction). Suppose now for a contradiction that
dV (θ)/dθ ≤ 0. Since z = ku(1− V )/(ku(1− V ) + kV ), we obtain dz(θ)/dθ > 0. This in turn
yields dp(θ)/dθ > 0, where we have used (9). Finally, since q = zp, we obtain dq(θ)/dθ > 0,
contradicting step 1. This establishes dV (θ)/dθ > 0.
Step 3: We have I(θ) = p(θ)(1 − V (θ)), where p(θ) = p(ku(θ), q(θ)). Since by step 2
dV (θ)/dθ > 0, then dp(θ)/dθ ≤ 0 ⇒ dI(θ)/dθ < 0. We will now show that with logarithmic
returns the equilibrium probability of infection is non-increasing in θ.
Fix k > 0 and consider g(k) defined in the following way:13 g(k) = ln k if k ≤ k, and
g(k) = ln k if k > k. Straightforward computations establish ku(θ)q(θ) =
(
α(1 − ) ln k)−1.
The proof is concluded by nothing that p(θ) = + (1− )αq(θ)ku(θ) =  ln k+1ln k .

Proof of Proposition 4: Our proof exploits the impact of α on the equilibrium of the
13While the returns defined in this example violate the assumptions of the basic model (g is here neither
twice continuously differentiable, nor strictly concave), simple inspection establishes that all our proofs and
results extend in this case too.
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PIGGV. Specifically, we first show that a rise in α induces a rise in the equilibrium value
of the externality α.q(V ;α) in the PIGGV. We then go on to show that Π(V ;α), the equi-
librium payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV, strictly decreases in the
contagiousness α. Finally we show that a (uniform) fall of the equilibrium payoff achieved by
unprotected individuals in the PIGGV implies a rise in the equilibrium protection rate of the
overall game.
Step 1: Let α2 > α1, and fix V . Let q(V ;α) denote the equilibrium incidence in the PIGGV
under contagiousness α. Suppose for a contradiction that α2.q(V ;α2) ≤ α1.q(V ;α1). An
unprotected individual would then find it optimal to interact at least as much under α2 as
under α1 (due to lower marginal cost of interaction). Since V is fixed, we must then have
z2 ≥ z1. But then, from equation (9), each unprotected individual has higher probability
of infection under α2. Given that q = zp, this implies q(V ;α2) ≥ q(V ;α1), and ultimately
α2.q(V ;α2) > α1.q(V ;α1) – contradicting our original assumption. Thus a rise in α induces a
rise in the equilibrium externality α.q(V, α) in the PIGGV.
Step 2: From step 1, the (PIGGV) equilibrium value of α.q(V ;α) strictly increases in α. In
equilibrium, the maximum payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV thus
strictly decreases in α. This implies that Π(V ;α), the equilibrium payoff achieved by unpro-
tected individuals in the PIGGV, strictly decreases in α.
Step 3: It was shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that the equilibrium protection rate V
is determined by the intersection of (the strictly increasing function of V ) Π(V ;α) and the
horizontal schedule 2r(k)− γ. From step 2, we know that Π(V, α) is strictly decreasing in α.
It then follows that the equilibrium protection rate V must increase in α. Specifically, there
exist α and α, α ≤ α, such that in equilibrium: V = 0 if α ≤ α, V ∈ (0, 1) if α ∈ (α, α), and
V = 1 if α ≥ α.
We can now conclude the proof of the proposition. Let α and α be as defined in step
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3. Consider first α ≤ α. The equilibrium protection rate is V = 0. It follows that (in the
overall game) the equilibrium value of the externality is α.q(0;α). From step 1, α.q(0;α)
strictly increases in α. From the optimization problem (10), the equilibrium interaction ku
of unprotected individuals thus strictly decreases in α. Consider next α ∈ (α, α). We have
over this range V ∈ (0, 1); so individuals are indifferent between protecting or not. The
maximum payoff attainable by unprotected individuals is thus 2r(k)− γ over the entire range
– the payoff they could achieve by protecting. Since the maximum payoff attainable by
unprotected individuals is strictly decreasing in the externality α.q, the equilibrium value of
α.q must remain constant over the whole range α ∈ (α, α). This in turn implies that over
this range (i) the equilibrium incidence q strictly decreases, (ii) the equilibrium interaction ku
of unprotected individuals remains constant, and (iii) the equilibrium probability of infection
p remains constant too. Since q = zp, the equilibrium value of z thus strictly falls over this
range. The identity
V =
ku(1− z)
ku + z(k − ku)
then shows that V strictly rises over this range. Finally, for α ≥ α all individuals protect in
equilibrium, and each individual interacts according to k.

Lemma 2 Let α and α as defined in Proposition 4. Then both variables are decreasing in ,
the exogenous probability of infection.
Proof: It is easy to see that Π(V ), the equilibrium payoff of the PIGGV, decreases with .
This follows from the fact that the payoff of a susceptible may be written as ri(ki)+(1−)(1−
αqiki)ri(k): best responses in the PIGGV are thus increasing in . Intuitively, increasing 
make susceptibles ‘fatalistic’, lowering the marginal cost of interaction. By (9), therefore, the
equilibrium probability of infection in the PIGGV increases in . Using (6) then shows that
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Π(V ) decreases in .
Recall that the equilibrium protection rate V in the overall game is given by the intersection
of Π(V ) (an increasing schedule) and 2r(k)− γ. Using the first step, the equilibrium V thus
increases in . This concludes the proof since we know from Proposition 4 that V increases in
α, and α (resp. α) is defined as the lowest value (resp. highest value) for which V > 0 (resp.
V < 1).

Proof of Proposition 5: The proof of existence follows the line of Lemma 1, and is therefore
omitted. We next show that an equilibrium is unique (and interior in both communities) for
β positive but small.
The equilibrium protection rates V (θJ), J ∈ {H,L}, are interior for types of homogenous
populations. At β = 0, the unique equilibrium is thus interior in both communities. Let QJ
denote the incidence within community J , i.e.
QJ =
∫
i∈J (1− vi)pikidi∫
i∈J kidi
. (11)
Making β and Q−J into parameters and focusing on community J we can – by analogy with
the analysis of homogenous populations – define within community J the pure interaction game
given protection rate VJ . This is a game played among unprotected individuals in community
J choosing how much to interact when the remaining fraction VJ of community J protects,
a fraction β of interaction occurs across communities, and the incidence of the disease in the
other community is Q−J . Let Π(VJ ; β,Q−J) denote the equilibrium payoff achieved by the
players in this game; notice that Π(VJ ; 0, Q−J) = Π(VJ), where Π(VJ) denotes the equilibrium
payoff achieved by unprotected individuals in the PIGGV of Lemma 1. Repeating the same
steps as in the proof of Lemma 1 establishes that Π(VJ ; β,Q−J) is strictly increasing in VJ .
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Taylor expanding yields
Π(VJ ; β,Q−J) = Π(VJ ; 0, Q−J) +O(β) = Π(VJ) +O(β). (12)
The payoff to protected individual in community J is 2rJ(k) − γ ∈ (Π(0),Π(1)), J ∈
{H,L}, since the unique equilibrium in a homogenous population of type θ is interior for
both types θ = θH and θ = θL. This implies, by (12), that for β small 2rJ(k) − γ ∈
(Π(0, β,Q−J),Π(1, β,Q−J)), J ∈ {H,L}, and arbitrary Q−J . Hence, for β small any equilib-
rium of our game must be interior for both communitys (i.e. VJ ∈ (0, 1), J ∈ {H,L}).
Lastly, we show that, for any β, at most one equilibrium exists that is interior for both
communities. In an interior equilibrium for both communities, an individual in community J
must be indifferent between protecting or not. The payoff from protection is constant, and
so is the payoff to an unprotected individual. The payoffs to an unprotected individual are
strictly falling in the incidence, so an individual in community J must be facing a constant
incidence q(θJ) (recall here that q(θJ) denotes the equilibrium incidence in a homogenous
population with type θJ). An interior equilibrium thus entails q(θJ) = βQ−J + (1 − β)QJ ,
J ∈ {H,L}. Solving for QJ , J ∈ {H,L}, yields
QH =
1
2
[
q(θL) + q(θH) +
q(θL)− q(θH)
2β − 1
]
(13)
QL =
1
2
[
q(θL) + q(θH)− q(θL)− q(θH)
2β − 1
]
. (14)
QH and QL are thus uniquely determined. Since individuals in community J face q(θJ),
interaction of unprotected individuals in community J is uniquely determined too, as is the
probability of infection for these individuals. Equation (11) now determines VJ . This shows
that an equilibrium that is interior for both communities is uniquely determined.
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We next establish parts 1-3 of the Proposition. We know from Proposition 3 that equi-
librium incidence is falling in population type; so q(θL) − q(θH) > 0. Using (13)-(14), QH
is therefore in equilibrium strictly decreasing in β while QL is strictly increasing. Since in-
dividuals in community J face q(θJ) throughout, interaction of unprotected individuals in
community J remains fixed (in equilibrium) as we vary β. Similarly, as we vary β, the proba-
bility that an unprotected individual becomes infected remains constant in each community.
An inspection of the expression for QJ in (11) reveals that changes in incidence must occur
entirely through adjustments in the rate of protection, VJ . VH therefore strictly increases in
β while VL strictly decreases. This establishes part 1 of the Proposition.
The arguments for Parts 2 and 3 of the Proposition are similar to those used in the proof
of Proposition 3.

Proof of Proposition 6: q(θJ), recall, denotes the equilibrium incidence of the disease in a
homogenous population with type θJ . We first show that q(θJ) ∈ (0, ) implies V (θJ) ∈ (0, 1),
i.e. that the unique equilibrium in a homogenous population with type θJ is interior. V (θJ) =
1 is impossible, as this would imply q(θJ) = 0. V (θJ) = 0, on the other hand, would imply
q(θJ) = p(θJ), the equilibrium probability of infection for unprotected individuals. Thus, by
(3), q(θJ) ≥  (recall,  is the probability of contracting the disease exogenously), contradicting
our initial assumption. This finishes to establish that V (θJ) ∈ (0, 1), J ∈ {H,L}.
Since the unique equilibrium in a homogenous population is interior for both types, indi-
viduals of type θJ are exactly indifferent between vaccinating or not when facing the incidence
q(θJ). By the same token, they strictly prefer vaccinating if facing q > q(θJ), and strictly
prefer remaining unprotected if facing q < q(θJ).
As in Proposition 5, let qJ denote the incidence facing individuals in community J and QJ
the incidence within community J . Thus here qJ = Q−J , since an individual in community
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J interacts exclusively with individuals in communities −J . Suppose an equilibrium exists in
which some individual in community J protects. We will first show that if all individuals in
community −J remain unprotected, then it must be that all individuals in community J in
fact protect. We will then show that if some individual in community −J protects, then the
equilibrium must be interior.
If all individuals in community −J remain unprotected, each of them must be infected
with probability  at least , inducing qJ = Q−J ≥ . But q(θJ) < , so if all individuals in
community −J remain unprotected then all individuals in community J must protect. This
in turn makes it optimal for individuals in community −J not to protect.
Next, suppose that some individual in −J protects. We must then have q−J = QJ ≥
q(θ−J). Since q(θ−J) > 0, some individual in community J must therefore be unprotected.
Thus, in community J , some individuals protects while others do not. By symmetry, the
same must then be true for community −J . This shows that if some individual in community
−J protects, then the equilibrium must be interior in both communities. Furthermore, this
equilibrium is fully characterized by the condition QJ = q(θ−J), J ∈ {H,L}. The arguments
above establish that there exist exactly three equilibria, satisfying the description given in the
statement of the Proposition.

Proof of welfare ranking: As in Proposition 3, let p(ki, qi) denote the infection probability
of i interacting according to ki and facing incidence qi. We then have
W1 =
1
2
(
2θHg(k)− γ
)
+
1
2
[
θLg(ku(θL)) +
(
1− p(ku(θL), 0)
)
θLg(k)
]
W2 =
1
2
(
2θLg(k)− γ
)
+
1
2
[
θHg(ku(θH)) +
(
1− p(ku(θH), 0)
)
θHg(k)
]
,
where here ku(θJ) is used to denote the optimal interaction of unprotected individuals in
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community J facing zero incidence. Thus W1 −W2 = 1/2[T (θH)− T (θL)], where
T (θ) =
(
2θg(k)− γ
)
− θg(ku(θ))−
(
1− p(ku(θ), 0)
)
θg(k).
Differentiating yields
dT
dθ
= 2g(k)− g(ku(θ))−
(
1− p(ku(θ), 0)
)
g(k),
where we have used the fact that ku(θ) is optimal for an unprotected individual in community
J facing zero incidence. But then, clearly, dT
dθ
> 0 and so W1 > W2.
That both W1 and W2 are strictly greater than W3 follows from the observation that
W3 = 1/2(2θHg(k)−γ)+1/2(2θLg(k)−γ), while the maximum payoff attained by unprotected
individuals is strictly greater when facing zero incidence than when facing q(θJ) > 0.

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